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COMMENTS 
Legitimate Classification and Nonpunitive 
Confiscation: Avoiding the Bill of Attainder 
Proscription 
It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe 
general rules for the government of society; the application of 
those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty 
of other departments. 
-Chief Justice John Marshallt 
A bill of attainder is a legislative enactment imposing pun- 
ishment upon a named or easily ascertainable individual or group 
without further judicial determination.* The Constitution of the 
United States prohibits such enactments by Congress3 or by state 
 legislature^.^ In Nixon v. Administrator of General S e r v i ~ e s , ~  the 
United States Supreme Court held that Congress is not precluded 
by the attainder clause from enacting a statute imposing burden- 
some consequences upon even a named individual, so long as the 
person so identified constitutes a "legitimate class of one" and 
the interference with his private interests does not rise to the level 
of "punishment ." 
This Comment will examine the Nixon decision and its im- 
pact upon the attainder doctrine as developed in prior cases. The 
argument is not that the Nixon result is necessarily incorrect, but 
rather that the analysis employed by the Court fails to adequately 
address the issue of attainder. The doctrine as developed over the 
years is overburdened with notions borrowed from equal protec- 
1. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810). 
2. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977); Cummings v. 
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866). Historically, the bill of attainder always 
sentenced the attainted individual (or members of a group) to death. Any statute impos- 
ing punishment less than execution was termed a bill of pains and penalties. However, 
early dicta, subsequently approved, established that the proscription of the Constitution 
applied equally to both types of enactments; the term "bill of attainder" is used to denote 
both. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Sems., 433 U.S. at 537 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 
87, 138 (1810). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 9, cl. 3. 
4. Id. 5 10, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted the provisions identically. See 
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377-78 (1866). This Comment will use the term 
"attainder clause" without specifying the particular provision involved. 
5. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
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tion doctrine that have a limited place in the attainder context. 
The Nixon majority's approach represents the clearest example 
to date of the extent to which attainder doctrine has become 
encumbered with foreign concepts. In answer to the Nixon ap- 
proach, this Comment suggests an alternative analysis based 
upon the following definitions: 
1. A bill of attainder legislatively imposes punishment 
upon an individual or group whose activities or character have 
been adjudged blameworthy by the legislature. 
2. Punishment is either (a) the deprivation of an interest 
afforded due process protection or (b) other burdens imposed 
where consideration of all the circumstances indicates that the 
legislature has exceeded purely regulatory purposes. 
A. From Confederate Rebels to Communist Subversives 
For the most part, the mere existence of the attainder prohi- 
bition has been sufficient to deter the legislature from such enact- 
m e n t ~ . ~  After the Constitution's adoption, three-quarters of a 
6. The purposes for inclusion of the attainder clauses in the Constitution are open to 
considerable conjecture, since there was no debate or opposition on this point. Attainders 
confiscating land of Loyalists in the post-Revolutionary War era were rather common; it 
has been suggested that the prohibition was included as an olive branch to Great Britain 
in the interest of renewed commerce. Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
CONSTITUTION 93-98 (1956). 
Contemporaneous writings by the Framers are of little help in discerning the rationale 
behind these clauses. James Madison referred to the proscription against bills of attainder 
and ex  post facto laws as a "constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and 
private rights" and protection against "the fluctuating policy which has directed the 
public councils." THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 299 (Heritage ed. 1945). Alexander Hamilton 
mentioned the bill of attainder provision as part of his argument that the Constitution 
was the equivalent of a bill of rights, but he did not amplify this discussion to show what 
particular rights were intended to be protected by the clause. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, a t  
573 (Heritage ed. 1945). This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Cummings v. 
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322-23 (1866). 
The only extensive pronouncement by the Court as to the purposes behind the bill of 
attainder prohibition focused on separation of powers and due process safeguards avail- 
able in judicial determinations: 
The best available evidence, the writings of the architects of our constitutional 
system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, 
technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an 
implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legisla- 
tive exercise of the judicial function, or more simply-trial by legislature. 
. . . . 
. . . [Vhe Bill of Attainder Clause not only was intended as one imple- 
mentation of the general principle of fractionalized power, but also reflected the 
Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically 
independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness 
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century passed before the Supreme Court struck down an enact- 
ment as violative of the attainder clause.' Even then the offend- 
ing provisions were not clear-cut attempts to single out a group 
for punishment. 
Two companion cases reached the Court in 1866. In the first, 
Cummings v. Miss~uri,~ a Catholic priest challenged a provision 
of the 1865 Missouri Constitution requiring an expurgatory oath 
from those who sought to hold certain positions of trust. Teach- 
ers, clergymen, corporate managers, and trustees were all re- 
quired to swear that they had not taken any part in the rebellion 
against the Union. The second case, Ex parte Garland, involved 
a similar oath required by federal statute with respect to attor- 
neys admitted to practice before the federal courts. Since the 
provisions absolutely excluded an ascertainable class of persons 
(those who had participated in the Confederate cause) from 
pursuing desired vocations, the Court struck down both require- 
ments under the respective attainder clauses. The disability was 
deemed a penalty and therefore punishment. 
The Cummings decision adopted a broad approach to the bill 
of attainder question. First, the Court recognized that such bills 
need not be directed against an individual by name; they may be 
directed against an entire class.1° Similarly, conditional imposi- 
tion of punishment was no less prohibited than punishment abso- 
lutely imposed.ll Most importantly, the Cummings Court re- 
jected any formalistic approach to the attainder analysis: 
[Wlhat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The 
Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition 
of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons. . . . By banning 
bills of attainder, the Framers of the Constitution sought to . . . [limit] legisla- 
tures to the task of rule-making. 
United States v. Brown, 381 U S .  at  442, 445-46. Cf. Communist Party v. Subversive 
Activities Control Bd., 367 US.  1,84-87 (1961) (finding no bill of attainder because power 
to identify subversive groups delegated to an agency required to hold full hearings); De 
Veau v. Braisted, 363 U S .  144, 160 (1960) (Congress may specify with respect to a prior 
judicial determination of guilt). 
7. Some early cases referred to the attainder clause tangentially, usually in very 
broad terms. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U S .  (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) ("A bill of attainder 
may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both."); 
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827) ("By classing bills of attainder, 
ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts together, the general 
intent [of the clause] becomes very apparent; i t  is a general provision against arbitrary 
and tyrannical legislation over existing rights, whether of person or property."). 
8. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). 
9. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). 
10. 71 U S .  (4 Wall.) at 323. 
11. Id. a t  324. 
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was leveled at  the thing, not the name. It intended that the 
rights of the citizen should be secure against deprivation for past 
conduct by legislative enactment, under any form, however dis- 
guised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of enact- 
ment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile 
proceeding. l2 
As to the nature of rights protected against legislative depriva- 
tion, the Court recognized that punishment might include the 
deprivation of "any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed," 
including "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."13 
During the latter part of the 19th century, the broad lan- 
guage of the Cummings decision formed the basis of various un- 
successful attacks on statutes establishing minimum qualifica- 
tions for the practice of professions.14 The leading case in this 
period was Dent u. West Virginia15 which upheld a licensing stat- 
ute for doctors. In Dent, the Court reasoned that there was no 
absolute bar to presently unqualified persons and that the statute 
sought only to promote the health of citizens, not to punish any- 
one. A more difficult case from this era involved a bar from the 
practice of medicine imposed on convicted felons. In Hawker v. 
New York, l6 the Court sustained such a statute, despite its con- 
demnation of an identifiable class, because the disqualification 
was based on a prior judicial conviction.17 
12. Id. at 325. 
13. Id. at 320-22. 
14. Dictum from the Ex parte Garland opinion had anticipated such attacks: 
The Legislature may . . . prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any of 
the ordinary avocations of life. The question, in this case, is not as to the power 
of Congress to prescribe qualifications, but whether that power has been exer- 
cised as a means for the infliction of punishment. . . . 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 379-80. 
15. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
16. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
For a detailed examination of these and similar decisions and the distinctions upon 
which they are based, see Comment, The Constitutional Prohibition of Bills of Attainder: 
A Waning Guaranty of Judicial Trial, 63 YALE L.J. 844 (1954). 
17. Accord, De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (upholding a New York statute 
barring convicted felons from office in waterfront labor unions). In De Veau, the Court 
observed: 
The distinguishing feature of a bill of attainder is the substitution of a legislative 
for a judicial determination of guilt. . . . Clearly, [this Act] embodies no 
further implications of appellant's guilt than are contained in his 1920 judicial 
conviction . . . . The question . . . where unpleasant consequences are brought 
to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was 
to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the 
individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situa- 
tion, such as the proper qualifications for a profession. 
Id. at 160 (citation omitted). 
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Eighty years passed after Cummings and Ex parte Garland 
before the Supreme Court struck down another federal statute on 
bill of attainder grounds. In United States v. Lovett,lB the Court 
summarily invalidated a provision of the Urgent Deficiency Ap- 
propriation Act of 194319 denying compensation to three named 
individuals who, in the view of the House Un-American Activities 
Committee, were "guilty" of subversive activities. The case is 
most notable, however, for Justice Frankfurter's concurrence that 
rejected the attainder challenge but dealt a t  length with the 
issue.20 Justice Frankfurter advocated a narrow, historical ap- 
proach to the attainder issue, setting out his view of the necessary 
elements as follows: 
[I] All bills of attainder specify the offense for which the 
attainted person was deemed guilty and for which [2] the pun- 
ishment was imposed. [3] There was always a declaration of 
guilt [4] either of the individual or the class to which he be- 
longed. The offense might be a pre-existing crime or an act 
made punishable ex post  fact^.^' 
Under Frankfurter's approach, the punishment element required 
that the deprivation be retribution for past actsnZ2 
Over the next fifteen years, Justice Frankfurter's concur- 
rence in Lovett cast a long shadow over several decisions involv- 
ing "antisubversive" enactments in which the Court narrowed 
the notion of "punishment." In American Communications Asso- 
ciation v. D ~ u d s , ~ ~  for example, the Court found no bill of attain- 
der in a denial of access to the quasi-judicial National Labor 
Relations Board when union officers refused to file affidavits de- 
nying present membership in the Communist Party. The Court 
viewed the proscription as a requirement of conformity to present 
standards, not as punishment for past acts. A "loyalty oath" 
required of Los Angeles public employees was upheld as a reason- 
18. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
19. Ch. 218, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943). 
20. 328 U.S. at 318-30 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter concurred 
only in the result: compensation for the three federal employees who had continued their 
work despite the congressional attempt to cut off their pay. Frankfurter would have 
allowed compensation on the basis of quantum meruit recovery in contract. Id. at 330. 
21. Id. at 322-23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter was apparently 
unaware of the English precedent for conditional attainders, e.g., the bill against the Earl 
of Clarendon during the reign of Charles II cited in Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 324. 
Frankfurter also failed to address the broad approach of the Cummings Court. See notes 
10-13 and accompanying text supra. 
22. 328 U.S. at 324. 
23. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
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able qualification in Garner v .  Board of Public Works.24 The 
Garner Court distinguished Cummings and Ex parte Garland on 
the grounds that the Los Angeles oath barred public employment 
only, not entrance to an entire profession. In Flemming v.  
N e ~ t o r , ~ ~  the Court found no attainder in denial of Social Se- 
curity benefits to aliens deported for past Communist activities. 
"[Mlere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit" did 
not constitute punishment .26 
In Communist Party v .  Subversive Activities Control 
Board, 27 the bill of attainder challenge failed for lack of specificity 
in the enactment. The Subversive Activities Control Act of 195028 
had required registration of all "communist action organiza- 
tions." The determination of what groups were subject to the 
regulations was left to an administrative board empowered to 
hold public investigative hearings and to issue registration orders. 
The Court noted "constitutional significance" in the fact that 
Congress did not name the Communist Party in the enactmentBZ9 
Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion easily disposed of the at- 
tainder issue: 
[The Act] attaches not to specified organizations but to de- 
scribed activities in which an organization may or may not en- 
gage. . . . I t  requires the registration only of organizations 
which . . . are found to . . . operate primarily to advance cer- 
tain objectives. This finding must be made after full administra- 
tive hearing, subject to judicial review which opens the record 
for . . . determination whether the administrative findings as to 
fact are supported by the preponderance of the evidence.30 
Implicitly, the Court recognized that the evil of attainder lies in 
a lack of due process; that defect was avoided in this case through 
the administrative hearing procedure. 
The Warren Court's most significant bill of attainder deci- 
sion resoundingly rejected the narrow interpretations of the cases 
following Lovett. In United States v .  Brown,31 the Court struck 
down section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis- 
closure Act of 1959.32 Section 504 was a substantially identical 
24. 341 U.S. 716, 722-23 (1951). 
25. 363 U S .  603 (1960). 
26. Id. at 617. 
27. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
28. Ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (current version at 50 U.S.C. # # 781-798 (1970)). 
29. 367 U S .  at 84-85. 
30. Id. at 86-87. 
31. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
32. 29 U.S.C. # 504 (1970). 
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replacement of the provision upheld in D o u d ~ . ~ ~  Chief Justice 
Warren's majority opinion seemed to signal a return to the broad 
approach of Cummings. The Court noted that the attainder 
clause "was intended not as a narrow, technical . . . prohibi- 
t i ~ n , " ~ ~  and rejected the notion that "punishment" required some 
element of re t r ib~t ion .~~ 
B. The Nixon Decision 
The recent case of Nixon u. Administrator of General 
Services36 is the first reexamination of bill of attainder doctrine 
by the Court since Br~wn.~ '  More intense interest in other separa- 
tion of powers issues has relegated this aspect of the case to rela- 
tive obscurity; Justice Stevens, however, saw such "serious ques- 
tions" that his concurrence addressed only the bill of attainder 
issue.38 Particularly disturbing is the fact that the statute in- 
volved arose from a circumstance that typically surrounds tradi- 
tional bills of attainder: a political crisis in which the object of 
the legislation is an unsuccessful political foem3@ 
1. Background and posture of the case 
In the wake of his resignation, former President Richard M. 
Nixon entered into an agreement with the Administrator of Gen- 
33. See note 23 and accompanying text supra. The Court noted that the provision 
involved in Douds was factually distinguishable in that the new provision required affida- 
vits denying Communist Party membership during the past five years. The Court stated, 
however, that the Douds decision involved a misreading of the Lovett holding. 381 U.S. 
at 457-58, 460. 
34. 381 U.S. at 422. 
35. Id. a t  458-60. 
36. While several recent attainder decisions have split the Court 5-4 (e.g., Brown and 
Flemming), the 7-2 Nixon decision would hardly seem to be close or controversial. Indeed, 
on the attainder issue, the split may well have been 8-1 since Justice Rehnquist's dissent 
addressed only the separation of powers issue. 433 U.S. at 545. The Chief Justice entered 
the only dissent on the bill of attainder issue. Id. a t  536. Three justices, however, expressed 
some serious reservations about the majority analysis. Justice White said that the Act does 
not inflict punishment and simply cited his dissent in Brown. Id. at 487. But he also 
questioned the applicability of the eminent domain "just compensation" rationale, a t  
least with respect to some of the materials. Id. a t  487-91. Justices Blackmun and Stevens 
both expressed hope that the congressional action in this case would not set a precedent 
for future dispositions of Presidential materials. Id. a t  486, 491. These sentiments by the 
concurring Justices indicate that some uneasiness exists among four members of the Court 
about the nature of the congressional action. 
37. At least twice in the interim, the issue was raised but not reached by the Court. 
Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64,67-68 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 
864-65 (1966). 
38. 433 U.S. a t  484 (Stevens, J., concumng). 
39. See generally Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, a t  90-144. 
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era1 Services, Arthur F. Samp~on,~O to transfer to California the 
materials accumulated by the executive branch during Nixon's 
administration-including the infamous White House tapes. Mr. 
Nixon was to have ultimate control over access to the materials. 
The materials were to be perserved for three years (or, in the case 
of the tapes, five years), after which time Mr. Nixon could remove 
or destroy any materials he might choose. The remaining materi- 
als would be given to the United States after the establishment 
of a Presidential library." In any event, all of the original tapes 
were to be destroyed upon Mr. Nixon's death, but not later than 
September 1, 1984. 
At the request of the Watergate special prosecutor, President 
Ford prevented execution of the agreement in order to facilitate 
access to the materials necessary for the pending Watergate pros- 
ecution~. '~ Mr. Nixon filed suit to force implementation of the 
agreement." Before that case was decided, however, Congress 
took action to invalidate the agreement. Without holding a hear- 
ing, the Senate Committee on Government Operations voted out 
Senate bill 4016, eventually enacted in 1974 as the Presidential 
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act4' (the Act or the Pres- 
ervation Act). The Act directed the Administrator of General 
Services to obtain or maintain control of "the Presidential histori- 
cal materials of Richard M. N i ~ o n . " ~ ~  The Act provides that the 
40. The agreement was embodied in a letter dated September 6, 1974, and accepted 
by Mr. Sampson on September 7, 1974. The letter is set out in its entirety as Appendix A 
to the decision in Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107,160-62 (D.D.C.), stayed per curiam 
sub nom. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied per 
curiam, 513 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975), dismissed as moot sub nom. Nixon v. Sampson, 
437 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1977). 
41. The statutory basis for Presidential libraries denominates them "archival de- 
positories." 44 U.S .C. 5 4 2107-2108 (1970). 
42. Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 163-64 app. B (D.D.C.), stayed per curiam 
sub nom. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied per 
curiam, 513 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975), dismissed as moot sub nom. Nixon v. Sampson, 
437 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1977). 
43. Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C.), stayed per curiam sub nom. Nixon 
v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied per curium, 513 F.2d 
430 (D.C. Cir. 1975), dismissed as moot sub nom. Nixon v. Sampson, 437 F. Supp. 654 
(D.D.C. 1977). 
44. Pub. L. No. 93-526,88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (codified a t  44 U.S.C. $ 4  2107 note, 3315- 
3324 (Supp. V 1975)). 
45. Id. § 101 (codified a t  44 U.S.C. § 2107 note). Section 101(a) of the Act deals 
specifically with the White House tapes and directs that "any Federal employee in posses- 
sion shall deliver, and the Administrator . . . shall receive, obtain, or retain, complete 
possession and control of '  such materials. Subsection (b) directs the Administrator to 
"receive, retain, or make reasonable efforts to obtain, complete possession and control of 
all papers, documents, memorandums, transcripts, and other objects and materials which 
constitute the Presidential historical materials of Richard M. Nixon, covering the period 
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materials be made available, as appropriate, to Mr. Nixon, exec- 
utive agencies and departments, and the courts.46 The Adminis- 
trator is directed to issue regulations protecting the materials and 
regulating public access for the protection of private interests 
involved.47 The Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia to hear chal- 
lenges to the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, and 
grants docket priority to such suits? In the event that the court 
should find a deprivation of private property, the Act authorizes 
payment of "just c~mpensation. ' '~~ Title I1 of the Act5' created a 
commission to study questions concerning records of all federal 
officials .51 
Former President Nixon immediately filed an action against 
the Administrator of General Services challenging the Act's con- 
stitutionality and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.52 Mr. 
beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 9, 1974." 
Both subsections begin with this proviso: "Notwithstanding any other law or any 
agreement or understanding made pursuant to [44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1970)l. . . ." Section 
2107 authorizes the Administrator of General Services to accept for deposit Presidential 
papers and historical materials "subject to restrictions agreeable to the Administrator as 
to their use." 
46. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 4 102,88 Stat. 1695, 1696 (1974) (codified a t  44 U.S.C. 9 2107 
note (Supp. V 1975)). 
47. Id. §§  103-104. 
48. Id. $ 105(a). 
49. Id. § 105(c). The Congress anticipated the constitutional challenges to the legisla- 
tion and attempted to shore up  the weak points. In this particular instance, the intent 
was to characterize the bill as an exercise of eminent domain power, contingent upon a 
subsequent court determination that there had been a taking. 
50. Title I1 of the Act was separately titled as the "Public Documents Act." Id. 8 201 
(codified a t  44 U.S.C. 9 3315 note). 
51. Id. $ 4  201-202 (codified a t  44 U.S.C. §§  3315-3324). 
Republicans objected to the Act, pointing out the possibility of a bill of attainder 
challenge for failure to make title I generally applicable even to all future Presidents. In 
his lengthy comments on the Senate floor, Senator Hruska became the main exponent of 
the constitutional objections. See 120 CONG. REC. 33863-73 (1974). 
Senator Griffin unsuccessfully sought to amend the Act so as to make it generally 
applicable to federal officials. Senator Ervin, however, objected: 
[Tlhe question of whether we would adopt a generic bill was considered fully 
by the Government Operations Committee a t  the time we voted to report this 
bill. It was the unanimous agreement that we should not attempt to do so. . . . 
If we attempt to put too much of a burden on one little nag that has to make 
a speedy journey we prevent the necessary speed being made, and it might break 
the back of the nag . . . . 
120 CONG. REC. 33860-61 (1974). 
52. With this second case pending, the first suit was decided on the grounds that the 
Act invalidated the Nixon-Sampson agreement. Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107,124. 
The district court's opinion covers almost 50 pages and seems overly long in light of the 
pending action. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the first action as moot. Nixon 
v. Sampson, 437 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1977). 
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Nixon urged six grounds of unconstitutionality: (1) separation of 
powers, (2) Presidential privilege of confidentiality, (3) privacy, 
(4) freedom of speech and political association, (5) equal protec- 
tion, and (6) bill of attainder. The three-judge district court 
found the privacy claims most difficult, but upheld the Act on all 
grounds." On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.54 
Justice Brennan's majority opinion systematically disposed 
of Nixon's objections. The Act did not compromise separation of 
powers principles, the Court observed, because the executive 
branch retained control of the materials and became a party to 
the Act upon the signature of President Ford.55 A major factor in 
the rejection of Presidential privilege, privacy, and first amend- 
ment association claims was the limited nature of the intrusion 
by the archivists during the screening process coupled with the 
safeguards to be incorporated in the regulations on access to the 
materials? The equal protection challenge was not pursued on 
appeal.=' 
2. The Court's bill of attainder analysis 
Justice Brennan rejected the bill of attainder challenge to the 
Preservation Act, holding that Mr. Nixon constituted a 
"legitimate class of one" and that any burden imposed upon him 
was not punishment in the constitutional sense.58 The decision 
was based upon a two-pronged analysis derived from the defini- 
tion of an attainder as a bill which (1) inflicts punishment with- 
out judicial trial (2) upon a specified individual or group.59 Nixon 
argued that the Preservation Act violated the prohibition against 
bills of attainder because it was based upon a legislative determi- 
53. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433 
U.S. 425 (1977). 
54. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
55. Id. a t  441-46. 
56. Id. a t  446-68. A detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
57. The Supreme Court noted the abandonment of the equal protection reliance and 
remarked that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law . . . ." Id. at 
471 n.33. 
For a more extensive treatment of these issues see 11 AKRON L. REV. 373 (1977). 
58. Id. a t  468-84. 
59. The only definition of a bill of attainder in the majority opinion-"a law that 
legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual 
without provision of the protections of a judicial trialw-appears within the Court's sum- 
mary of Nixon's argument. Id. a t  468. Therefore, i t  is somewhat ambiguous whether this 
is the definition accepted by the majority or merely a restatement of the definiton urged 
by Nixon. , 
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nation of his individual "blameworthiness.~~60 The Court charac- 
terized Nixon's interpretation of the attainder clause as a prohibi- 
tion against undesired consequences imposed upon an individual 
or group not defined at a proper level of generality. The Court 
refused to extend the doctrine that far because to do so would 
remove "the anchor that ties the bill of attainder guarantee to 
realistic conceptions of classification and punishment?l Such an 
approach, reasoned the majority, would prove unworkable since 
any group subject to adverse legislation could complain that the 
enactment lacked sufficient generality." The Court then pro- 
ceeded to examine the specificity and punishment elements sepa- 
rately. 
The specificity element was not satisfied because former 
President Nixon constituted a "legitimate class of one." Congress 
permissibly limited the scope of the legislation because his were 
the only materials demanding immediate attention: he was the 
only former President who had not yet placed his materials in a 
library, and the tapes would be destroyed under the Nixon- 
Sampson agreement upon his death.63 The majority also consid- 
ered the overall intent of the statute, looking at title I1 as an 
indication that Congress intended similar regulation of other fed- 
eral officials in the future.64 
With respect to the punishment element of the analysis, the 
majority adopted a multifaceted approach, recognizing that pun- 
ishment may be discerned from a number of perspectives. First, 
the Court applied a historical test: whether the deprivation or 
disability of the statute is one traditionally associated with at- 
tainders, i. e., death,15 imprisonment, banishment, property con- 
fiscation, or employment bar." The majority found the provision 
in the Act for "just compen~ation"~ inconsistent with a finding 
60. Brief for Appellant at 130-35. 
61. 433 U.S. a t  470. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 471-72. 
64. Id. a t  472. In so doing, the Court made a quantum leap. The National Study 
Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials created by title I1 could only 
recommend legislation relating to the preservation of such materials. Actual enactment 
would require further affirmative action by the Congress. 
The Study Commission report recommended that all materials created in public 
service should be government property and that elected officials should be allowed to  
restrict access to the materials for a maximum of 15 years. NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION 
ON RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, FINAL REPORT 29-42 (1977). 
65. See note 2 supra. 
66. 433 U.S. a t  473-74. 
67. See note 49 and accompanying text supra. 
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of "punitive confiscation of property."" Second, a functional test 
looking to the type and severity of the burdens imposed was ap- 
plied to determine whether the challenged law "reasonably can 
be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes."" The Court 
saw no implication of punishment, finding the Preservation Act 
to be "nonpunitive legislative policymaking" based on legitimate 
congressional interests in preserving both trial evidence and his- 
torically valuable records.'O A third test, characterized as 
"motivational," was employed to consider "whether the legisla- 
tive record evinces a congressional intent to punish."71 The major- 
ity saw no reason to overturn the finding of the district court that 
the legislative concern was focused not upon Richard Nixon but 
upon the Nixon-Sampson depository agreement that Congress 
perceived to be inimical to the public interest.72 The Act was 
therefore " 'regulatory and not punitive in character.' "73 
In connection with the motivational test, Justice Brennan 
examined a number of other considerations that he found to be 
inconsistent with any punitive intent. First, the Act itself con- 
tains several provisions designed to protect Mr. Nixon's interests: 
the right to access, regulations which permit any party to assert 
legal or constitutional rights or privileges, and the assurance of 
district court jurisdiction with docket priority." Mr. Nixon had 
asserted that a less burdensome alternative existed whereby Con- 
gress could achieve its legitimate purposes;75 the Court, however, 
concluded that the suggested judicial inquiry pursuant to a man- 
dated civil action would be "no less punitive and intrusive than 
the solution actually adopted."76 The Court also refused to make 
inferences based upon the Justices' own "personalized reading" 
of the social and political realities of 1974, and limited review to 
the terms of the Act, the intent of Congress, and the existence vel 
non of legitimate explanations for the law's effects.77 
3. The Burger dissent 
The Chief Justice filed a lengthy, angry dissent accusing the 
68. 433 U.S. at 474-75. 
I I .  Id. at 483-84. 
Id. at 475-76. 
Id. at 476-78. 
Id. at 478. 
Id. at 478-81. 
Id. at 478 (quoting the district court's opinion, 408 F. Supp. at 373). 
Id. at 481-82; see notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra. 
Brief for Appellant at 137. 
433 U.S. at 482-83. 
671 BILLS OF ATTAINDER 79 
Court of becoming caught up in the passions of national crisis and 
joining with Congress "[tlo 'punish' one person" in a manner 
that "tears into the fabric of our constitutional f ra rne~ork ."~~ His 
opinion addressed three issues-separation of powers, privacy, 
and bill of attainder-where he saw well-settled principles bent 
under the "hydraulic pressure" of pervasive political intere~t. '~ 
As to the bill of attainder challenge, the Chief Justice found 
that title I of the Preservation Act clearly violated the constitu- 
tional proscription against "special legislation singling out one 
individual as the target."" He articulated the necessary elements 
of a bill of attainder as (1) a "specific designation of persons or 
groups as subjects of the legislation" and (2) an "arbitrary depri- 
vation, including deprivation of property rights, without notice, 
trial, or other hearing?' Under Burger's analysis the specificity 
requirement was met because Richard M. Nixon was named in 
the Act. The sole remaining issue, then, was whether there had 
been a legislatively imposed deprivation of an existing right. 
Ownership of the materials became the pivotal issue under 
Chief Justice Burger's deprivation analysis. He would have held 
for Mr. Nixon on the basis of tradition involving former Presi- 
dents, including legislative action upon a presumption of presi- 
dential owner~hip ,~~ a case involving a copyright on Presidential 
materials," and the practice of the Justices regarding their judi- 
cial papers.84 The Chief Justice also perceived a statutorily vested 
Presidential right to have a Presidential library at a location cho- 
sen by the President himself for deposit of such papers as he 
- - 
78. Id. at 505 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
79. Id. (quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (Justice Holmes had noted the tendency of great cases to make 
bad law)). 
80. Id. at  537. 
81. Id. at  538-39. 
82. Id. at  539-41 (based on hearings on the establishment of Presidential libraries). 
83. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, Circuit 
Justice) (upholding a copyright in certain Presidential materials of George Washington). 
The Folsom case was cited in an opinion given by Attorney General William B. Saxbe to 
President Ford. 43 OP. AIT'Y GEN. NO. 1 (Sept. 6, 1974). Saxbe's opinion concludes that 
Presidential ownership of papers and historical materials "has apparently been the almost 
unvaried understanding of all three branches of the Government since the beginning of 
the Republic . . . ." Id. 
84. An examination of the ownership issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. The 
Chief Justice's decision, however, is not the inevitable result had the question been 
reached by the majority. See Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107,133-45 (D.D.C. 1975), 
stayed per curiam sub nom. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), motion to vacate 
stay denied per curiam, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), dismissed as moot sub nom. Nixon v. 
Sampson, 437 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1977); Ford & Pollitt, Who Owns the Tapes?, 6 N.C. 
CENT. L.J. 197 (1975). 
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might selectY Since these rights were established in Mr. Nixon, 
Chief Justice Burger reasoned, the punishment element was sat- 
isfied by the Act's express denial of those preexisting interests. 
The Chief Justice then proceeded to criticize portions of the 
majority's analysis. He rejected any examination of congressional 
motives as irrelevant to bill of attainder scrutiny, because 
"retribution and vindictiveness are not requisite elements of a bill 
of attainder" and because notions of prevention are not unknown 
to the history of attainders.V3urger also attacked the idea of a 
"legitimate class of one," arguing that the classification scheme 
required the impermissible determination that either Nixon was 
culpably deserving of the deprivation or that his uniqueness justi- 
fied the confi~cation.~~ 
While the Nixon majority opinion represents the most well- 
developed analytic approach to the bill of attainder clause yet 
espoused, the Court failed to adopt an analysis that adequately 
reaches the evil of legislatively imposed punishment. This is not 
to say that the result was necessarily erroneous, but rather that 
the Nixon Court perceived the problem incorrectly. The confu- 
sion was the result of inconsistent holdings and reasoning in the 
line of attainder cases since Cumrning~.~~ The vacillating treat- 
ment of the issue in these decisions indicates a failure to develop 
a coherent, comprehensive bill of attainder doctrine. 
The Supreme Court has satisfactorily, if somewhat vaguely, 
defined a bill of attainder as a law that legislatively inflicts pun- 
ishment upon an identifiable person or group of persons without 
judicial trial? This Comment takes no exception to the basic 
framework within which the Court's analysis proceeds. The Court 
has stumbled, however, in the development of a clear conception 
of the two particular elements: (1) specificity and (2) punish- 
ment?O The difficulty apparently arises from failure, or inability, 
85. 433 US. at 541. 
86. Id. at 541-42. 
87. Id. at 543-44. 
88. See notes 8-35 and accompanying text supra. 
89. See note 59 supra. 
90. One commentator has argued that the lack of procecural due process should be 
regarded as a third necessary element. Comment, The Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder 
Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 212 (1966). This addition seems 
superfluous, however, since such safeguards are, by definition, lacking whenever there is 
a legislative imposition of punishment upon a specific individual or group. It is doubtful 
that the author of that Comment would permit such a bill if the legislature instituted the 
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to discern a pervasive policy behind the doctrine. This Comment 
proceeds on the theory, espoused by the Brown majority," that 
the attainder clause is a limit upon legislative power in the inter- 
est of due process. The safeguards available only in the judicial 
process guarantee a fair trial. Therefore, the bill of attainder pro- 
hibition serves to buttress the separation of powers principle 
embodied in the Const i t~t ion.~~ With this concept in mind, this 
section will critically examine the handling of each element with 
particular emphasis on the developments of the Nixon decision. 
A. Specificity 
By prohibiting a focus on particular individuals, the bill of 
attainder clause, viewed from a separation of powers perspective, 
limits the extent to which Congress and state legislatures may 
depart from making general ruled3 The Supreme Court has rec- 
ognized, however, that Congress or state legislatures need not 
always legislate for the whole world, but may attack specific 
problems, or even parts of a problem, that the legislature may 
deem to require immediate a t t e n t i ~ n . ~ ~  In equal protection cases, 
the doctrine of reasonable classification supplies the limit upon 
state legislative or congressionalg5 discretion. While the doctrine 
of reasonable classification may be appropriate to legislative re- 
mechanism to provide, within the legislative process itself, the safeguards available at 
judicial trial. 
91. See note 6 supra. 
92. See note 6 supra. Justice White criticized this idea in his Brown dissent: 
[Tlhere are substantial reasons for concluding that the Bill of Attainder Clause 
may not be regarded as enshrining any general rule distinguishing between the 
legislative and judicial functions. Congress may pass . . . private bills. I t  may 
also punish persons who commit contempt before it. So too, one may note that 
if Art. I, O 9, cl. 3 [the attainder clause applicable to Congress], immortalizes 
some notion of the separation of powers a t  the federal level, then Art. I, 5 10 
[the clause applicable to the States], necessarily does the same for the States. 
But it has long been recognized by this Court that "[wlhether the legislative, 
executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and 
separate . . . is for the determination of the State." Dreyer u. Illinois, 187 U.S. 
71, 84. 
381 U.S. a t  473 (White, J., dissenting). 
93. See note 1 and accompanying text supra. 
94. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 
348 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1955); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
95. By incorporating equal protection notions into the fifth amendment due process 
clause, the Court has extended the equal protection concept to limit congressional discre- 
tion as well as state legislative discretion. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 
638 n.2 (1975) ("approach . . . precisely the same," citing cases). But cf. Hampton v. 
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 & n.17 (1976) ("the two protections are not always 
coextensive"). 
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strictions by regulation, the bill of attainder clause absolutely 
prohibits the infliction of punishment upon designated individu- 
als. Nevertheless, the reasonable classification doctrine has found 
its way into attainder cases, and the Ninon decision undertook its 
ultimate extension through use of the concept of a "legitimate 
class of 
Consideration of the types of cases raising the attainder issue 
makes the intrusion of the reasonable classification doctrine at 
least understandable. Only twice has Congress been bold enough 
to name particular individuals as objects of public legi~lation.~~ 
Legislation has often sought to indirectly reach a particular group 
without explicitly designating the class of persons affected: Sev- 
eral of the attainder cases have involved expurgatory oaths 
whereby the "class" is ascertained when the individuals refuse to 
purge themselves of the taint of legi~lation.~~ By forcing the Court 
to examine the "classification" involved, such legislative schemes 
have invited the Court to test reasonableness as well. Challenges 
to statutes establishing qualifications for profesional practice 
have relied on language in Cummings regarding reasonable rela- 
tion to permissible state  objective^.^ In dealing with these chal- 
lenges, it was natural for the Court to employ reasonable classifi- 
cation analysis. But that the intrusion is understandable does not 
justify the continued application of a deficient form of analysis. 
A related and similarly defective analytic tool has occasion- 
ally been used by the Court. The Cummings Court had suggested 
that a bill of attainder aims at  "the person, not the calling."lw 
Subsequent decisions have predictably relied on this distinctionlol 
- - 
96. 433 U.S. at 472. 
97. See Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1943, ch. 218, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 
(the provision challenged in Louett); Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation 
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, §§  101-106, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974), (codified a t  44 U.S.C. § 2107 
note (Supp. V 1975)) (the law attacked in Nixon). In 1940, the Senate rejected a House- 
passed bill designed to deport Harry Bridges, an Australian communist labor organizer. 
Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, a t  146-47. 
98. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. a t  437; Gamer v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 
716 (1951); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Ex parte 
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) a t  333; Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at  277. 
99. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. at 119, 125-26; Hawker v. New York, 
170 U.S. at 198. 
100. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at  320. 
101. For example, the Court in De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960), upheld a 
New York statute barring convicted felons from leadership positions in waterfront labor 
unions. The issue, the Court observed, was "whether the legislative aim was to punish 
[an] individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about 
as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation." Id. a t  160. 
In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. a t  603, the Court relied on Cummings and De Veau 
in restating the distinction as one between "the person" and "the activity and status." 
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as a justification for a classification scheme. lo2 Even correctly 
applied, this approach has only surface appeal since its applica- 
tion requires that the person and the "calling" be mutually exclu- 
sive. It is futile hair-splitting to separate an individual from his 
"status" as a "legitimate class of one."lo3 
Although the reasonableness criterion has appeared in at- 
tainder cases since the earliest decisions, its decisive application 
in Nixon threatens the usefulness of the attainder doctrine as 
distinct from equal protection principles. The Nixon Court paid 
lip service to the fact that "the prohibition against bills of attain- 
der . . . was not intended to serve as a variant of the equal pro- 
tection doctrine,"lo4 but failed to recognize that a simple variant 
of equal protection doctrine is therefore inappropriate as the core 
of the bill of attainder analysis. I t  is difficult to hypothesize a 
Id. at 614. The Court, however, became bogged down in a conceptual morass and incor- 
rectly applied the test i t  had enunciated. Despite the unexplained inapplicability of the 
deprivation to all deportees, the Court held that the denial of Social Security benefits to 
those deported for subversive activities was the result of their present status as deportees, 
not because of legislative concern with the activities that led to their deportation. Id. at 
619-20. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan pointed out the misapplication of the 
person-calling distinction. Id. at  637-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
102. The relationship between this distinction as an analytic tool and reasonable 
classification doctrine is best illustrated by examining the context in which the language 
appears in the Cummings opinion. There, the Court had observed that 
[dualifications relate to the fitness or capacity of the party for a particular 
pursuit or profession. . . . I t  is evident . . . that many of the acts, from the 
taint of which [these parties] must purge themselves, have no possible relation 
to their fitness for those pursuits and professions. . . . The oath could not, 
therefore, have been required as a means of ascertaining whether parties were 
qualified or not . . . . It was required in order to reach the person, not the 
calling. 
71 U.S. at 319-20 (emphasis added). 
103. The Supreme Court did not use the person-calling distinction explicitly in its 
Nixon analysis, but it seems implicit in the argument that Congress was dealing with a 
problem separate from Mr. Nixon himself. The omission might be explained by the au- 
thorship of the opinion by Justice Brennan, the dissenter in Flemming. See note 101 supra. 
The district court disposition of the Nixon case did, however, apply the distinction. 408 
F. Supp. a t  373. 
104. 433 U.S. at 471. Since there was no equal protection clause at  the adoption of 
the Constitution or in 1866 when Cummings was decided (the fourteenth amendment was 
declared to be in force on July 28, 1868), such a categorical statement may be unwar- 
ranted. It  seems that, absent the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court could have 
made the attainder clauses a constitutional basis for an equal protection doctrine. The 
decisions through Nixon, with language reminiscent of the rational basis test, reinforce 
the notion that the two doctrines are somewhat related. The very broad approach of the 
Brown case (involving political association) might be seen as analogous to the strict 
scrutiny approach in fundamental rights areas under equal protection. It  might also be 
argued that Justice Frankfurter's "literalist" approach, advocated in Louett and subse- 
quent cases, was an attempt to discard the attainder analysis because he felt that the 
equal protection and due process doctrines protected essentially identical interests. 
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situation in which Congress would single out a particular individ- 
ual or group as the object of legislation without a legitimate con- 
cern for some permissible subject of regulation. Even should such 
a situation arise, Congress would have little difficulty in formu- 
lating the enactment so as to appear to deal with some permissi- 
ble legislative concern. 
The reasonable classification doctrine incorporated in the 
Court's attainder analysis became a major hurdle in the Brown 
case. The government had sought to justify the disqualification 
of Communist Party members from positions in labor unions by 
analogy to conflict-of-interest laws, specifically section 32 of the 
Banking Act of 19331°5 that excluded persons involved in the se- 
curities business from positions as directors, officers, or managers 
of Federal Reserve System banks.lo6 Distinguishing the disqualifi- 
cations proved most difficult and the Court's unsatisfactory han- 
dling of the issue contributed significantly to the influx of equal 
protection language into the discussion of attainders. The Court 
began by pointing out that the Banking Act did not aim a t  a 
political organization.lo7 Secondly, the Banking Act 
incorporates no judgment censuring or condemning any man or 
group of men. In enacting [ §  321, Congress relied on its general 
knowledge of human psychology, and concluded that the con- 
current holding of the two designated positions would present a 
temptation to any man-not just certain men or members of a 
certain political party. Thus insofar as § 32 incorporates a con- 
demnation, it condemns all men.lo8 
If the Court had stopped a t  this point, perhaps the distinction 
could have stood. Chief Justice Warren, however, went on to 
attempt a rulemaking-specification distinction. The conflict-of- 
interest law involved permissible rulemaking rather than specifi- 
cation, the Court reasoned, since "Congress merely expressed the 
105. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1970). 
106. The Court upheld this provision in Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 
(1947). 
107. 381 U.S. at 453-54. One commentator has suggested that the Court's remark 
should limit applicability of the attainder clauses to those laws which attempt to control 
so-called subversive political groups, the traditional target of the English attainders. Note, 
The Bill of Attainder Clauses and Legislative and Administrative Suppression of 
"Su buersiues, " 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1490 (1967). 
Such a political-nonpolitical distinction seems unnecessarily narrow. Should not the 
clause at  least be an effective weapon in defense of any fundamental right? For example, 
the attainder clauses seem clearly violated by an oath requirement for voting privileges 
aimed at  a religious group. Cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (attainder issue not 
raised in case involving an Idaho statutory provision disenfranchising Mormons). 
108. 381 U.S. at  453-54. 
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characteristics it was trying to reach in an alternative, shorthand 
way." "The designation of Communists as those persons likely to 
cause political strikes," the Court observed, "is not the substitu- 
tion of a semantically equivalent phrase; on the contrary, it rests 
. . . upon an empirical investigation by Congress of the acts, 
characteristics and propensities of Communist Party mem- 
bers."lo9 The Court's opinion did not explain how to determine 
which classifications are permissible uses of "shorthand" or how 
the enumeration of securities market personnel is "semantically 
equivalent" to any characteristics permissibly reached. Justice 
White's dissent correctly characterized the Court's action: The 
Court struck down the labor statute because it was both over- 
broad and underinclusive in that it assumed that all party mem- 
bers were likely to incite political strikes and it failed to reach 
nonmembers who would be likely to do so. Under such an analy- 
sis, the conflict-of-interest provision is indistinguishable.l10 The 
problem stemmed from an examination, using reasonable classi- 
fication terms taken from equal protection analysis, of the 
"specificity element." A satisfactory distinction could have re- 
sulted if the specificity element had been held satisfied in both 
contexts. Then the disqualification in the conflict-of-interest sit- 
uation could have been held not to constitute punishment, 
whereas the criminal sanctions imposed on Communist labor 
union officials would clearly meet the punishment requirement.ll1 
Likewise, to denote this element of the Nixon analysis 
"specificity" does not clearly evince the thrust of the Court's 
approach. This element, as perceived by the Court, involves more 
than a mere designation of an individual or group as the object 
of the legislation under scrutiny. Rather, the Court focused upon 
the justifiability of the specific designation. Sufficient justifica- 
tion legitimizes the classification and the "specificity element" is 
not satisfied.l12 The error of such analysis is easily exposed. The 
Nixon majority would not have proceeded from their finding of a 
"legitimate class of one" and allowed Congress to impose what- 
ever sanctions it pleased upon Mr. Nixon such as imprisonment, 
banishment, or confiscation of his San Clemente home. Clearly, 
-- - 
109. Id. at 454-55. 
110. Id. at 463-68 (White, J., dissenting). 
111. Quite apart from the attempt to distinguish the conflict-of-interest laws, the 
Brown majority seems to have correctly perceived the purposes behind the attainder 
provision: "The vice of attainder is that the legislature has decided for itself that certain 
persons possess certain characteristics and are therefore deserving of sanction, not that it 
has failed to sanction others similarly situated." 381 U.S. at 449 n.23 (emphasis added). 
112. 433 U.S. at 471-72. 
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the question of justifiability relates to the nature of the regulation 
imposed. Therefore, any determination of legitimacy should be 
confined to the analysis of the punishment element. 
Application of a reasonable classification mode of analysis to 
the specificity element fails to implement the separation of pow- 
ers basis for the bill of attainder prohibition. Under a legitimate 
class analysis, so long as the legislature can develop a case for 
uniqueness of an individual and the circumstances sought to be 
regulated, the Court has no check upon a legislative determina- 
tion of individual culpability. The Brown Court recognized such 
legislative evaluations as the true evil of attainder.l13 Any safe- 
guards provided by judicial review"* will be illusory except in the 
most egregious cases since the Court will look only for a 
"reasonable basis" on which the legislature would have made its 
determination. 115 
B. Punishment 
The question of what constitutes punishment for purposes of 
the attainder proscription has also given the Supreme Court con- 
siderable difficulty. The problem involves the tension between 
necessarily imposed regulations, which may be applicable only to 
a small segment of society, and burdens imposed selectively as 
punishment. The Nixon case illustrates the convergence of these 
competing forces. On one hand, Congress felt the need to prevent 
destruction of the White House tapes; on the other, a judgment, 
albeit implicit, that the former President was an unreliable cus- 
todian determined the form of the enactment. 
Under the analysis adopted by the Nixon majority, the pun- 
ishment element is satisfied by a positive result of the historical, 
functional, or motivational tests. Justice White, it should be 
noted, had argued for such a "multifold analysis" in his Brown 
dissent.'16 Clearly, this analysis represents the most careful ap- 
proach yet taken by the Court; nevertheless, significant problems 
remain. 
113. See note 111 supra. 
114. See note 48 and accompanying text supra. 
115. As in the Nixon case, the legislative determination may have been made without 
any hearing to allow input from the class affected by the legislation. 
116. 381 U.S. at  463 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White in turn lifted this sug- 
gested approach out of a nonattainder case that had relied on the attainder precedents, 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Justice White refused to join 
the opinion of the Nixon majority but concurred in the result, stating simply that the 
statute did not inflict punishment and citing his dissent in Brown. 433 U.S. at 487 (White, 
J., concurring). One might conjecture therefore that his failure to join the majority analy- 
sis is based on a disagreement over the approach to the specificity element. 
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The historical test supposedly looks for those forms of pun- 
ishment traditionally imposed by bills of attainder, i.e., death, 
imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of property, and bars to 
specified employment.l17 Clearly, the historical standard is a con- 
venient sample with which the enactment under scrutiny may be 
readily compared. The American experience, however, shows that  
the legislature is unlikely to impose any of the longstanding forms 
of punishment. Significantly, the final type (disqualifications 
from employment) is a relatively recent development, not estab- 
lished until Cummings. In fact, all three of the enactments struck 
down as attainders since adoption of the Constitution have been 
of this type, an extension of prior historical concepts of attainder 
punishment. Therefore, the historical test is of limited usefulness 
even if consistently applied. 
The historical test loses whatever efficacy i t  may have when 
the Court refuses to confront the historical concepts directly. The 
Nixon majority avoided the confiscation issue by confining the 
historical notion to "punitive confiscations of property." The 
majority seems to have opted for circumlocution-defining pun- 
ishment as something "punitive." The only indication given as to 
the application of this punitive-nonpunitive distinction was in 
the Court's reference to the provision for "just compensation" 
should the materials seized be determined to be Mr. Nixon's 
personal property.l18 The Court clearly inferred that an exercise 
of eminent domain powers could not be deemed punishment. 
Such an interpretation is not surprising since it follows the stan- 
dard rule of construction that two provisions of the same instru- 
ment must be construed, so far as possible, as consistent with 
each other. It is surprising that the Court would base part of its 
decision on an issue it did not fully address, i. e., whether the Act 
would be a proper exercise of the eminent domain power since 
such a taking must be for a public use.lLV 
The functional test enunciated by the Court involves an  
analysis of "whether the law under challenge, viewed in terms of 
the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said 
117. 433 U S .  at 473-74. 
118. Id. at 475; see note 49 and accompanying text supra. 
119. Justice White questioned whether some objects of the Preservation Act may 
properly be taken under the eminent domain power. 433 U S .  at 487-91 (White, J. ,  concur- 
ring). Mr. Nixon's attorneys might be faulted for allowing the Court to skim over the 
ownership and eminent domain issues. The latter issue was not argued in the brief; with 
respect to the ownership issue, Nixon's brief spoke of "control" and "access" rather than 
"ownership." Brief for Appellant at 140. Understandably, the Court seized on this lan- 
guage. See 433 U S .  at 481. 
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to further nonpunitive legislative purposes."120 Ostensibly this 
test is meant to check the legislature's ingenuity in devising new 
forms of punishment violative of the attainder prohibition. The 
standard apparently is the absence of any "legitimate legislative 
purpose" rather than an actual examination of the severity of the 
burdens imposed.121 The test so applied would cut too broadly. 
Like the legitimate classification analysis applied to the specifity 
element, the legitimate legislative purpose test is easily met, even 
by contrivance. For example, the Ex parte Garland Court, which 
had no historical basis for finding punishment in a bar to the 
practice of a profession,122 might have found that protection of 
federal judicial integrity provided a legitimate legislative pur- 
pose. Likewise, had the Court in Brown narrowly construed 
Cummings and Ex parte Garland (as finding punishment in a bar 
to the profession for which the aggrieved party was trained), it 
might have found a legitimate purpose in the protection of inter- 
state commerce from political strikes. Addition of the least bur- 
densome alternative con~iderat ion'~~ to the functional test could 
strengthen this portion of the analysis. This addition would pro- 
vide a more defensible standard by which the type of burden 
imposed might be measured. Although relevant as a factor in a 
multifold analysis, the severity of the deprivation cannot be de- 
terminative. As stated in Brown, "the Bill of Attainder Clause 
was not to be given a narrow historical reading . . . but was 
120. 433 U.S. a t  475-76. 
121. The authorities cited for the functional test are Cummings, Dent, Hawker, and 
others where the actual test applied was whether the purpose of the disability (disqualifi- 
cation) was to reach the person or the calling. 
Where no persuasive showing of a purpose "to reach the person, not the 
calling," [cited Cummings] has been made, the Court has not hampered legis- 
lative regulation of activities within its sphere of concern, despite the often- 
severe effects such regulation has had on the person subject to it [e.g., Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (deportation not punishment but 
exercise of plenary powers of Congress over aliens)]. 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 616. See also notes 100-03 and accompanying text supra. 
122. Except, of course, the Cummings case decided the same day and relied upon. 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377, 380. 
123. Examined in Nixon as a "final consideration," Nixon's suggested alternative, 
that the question of his custodial fitness might have been left to judicial determination, 
was rejected by the Court as equally intrusive as the alternative selected. 433 U.S. a t  482- 
83. In so doing, the Court missed the point that any determination of Mr. Nixon's unfit- 
ness would be made in the judicial context with the attendant safeguards. The Court made 
a curious statement, almost as if an afterthought, to the effect that "if the record were 
unambiguously to demonstrate that the Act represents the infliction of legislative punish- 
ment, the fact that the judicial alternative poses its own difficulties would be of no 
constitutional significance." Id. at 483. The fact that the punishment issue is ambiguous 
would seem to militate in favor of the judicial alternative as providing greater protection. 
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instead to be read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to 
bar: legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifi- 
cally designated persons or groups."lz4 
The motivational test, while clearly sound,lz5 seems to be of 
limited applicability. The effect is merely to admonish Congress 
to couch their enactment in carefully chosen language. Neverthe- 
less, should Congress fail to exercise such care, a legislative his- 
tory evincing a clear intent to punish should be dispositive of the 
case without further analysis. The circumstances leading to the 
Lovett decision would be of this type.lz6 
C. Summary 
The Supreme Court congratulated the Congress on its treat- 
ment of the Preservation Act challenged in Nixon; "the legisla- 
tive history of the Act," the Court observed, "offers a paradigm 
of a Congress aware of constitutional constraints on its power and 
carefully seeking to act within those limitations."lz7 These plau- 
dits referred to the provisions of the Act intended to avoid consti- 
tutional problems, i .  e., "just compensation, " Nixon's access to 
materials, regulation to protect the rights of Nixon and others, 
and the provision for judicial review. lz8 Unfortunately, similar 
commendations are not due the Court. 
The Court's present attainder doctrine is deficient in its ap- 
proach to both identified elements. The weakness of the punish- 
ment analysis lies in both the limited utility of the historical and 
motivational tests and the application of a minimum standard of 
any legitimate purpose as the functional test. The specificity 
analysis concentrates on a problem's uniqueness and severability 
and fails to  recognize that those are the very characteristics which 
make suspect the imposition of punishment upon the class so 
identified. 
124. 381 U.S. a t  447 (emphasis added). 
125. A motivational test seems to go against the line of cases holding that the judici- 
ary will not examine legislative motives. E.g., Barenblatt v. United States,, 360 U.S. 109, 
132-33 (1959); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,115 (1941); Arizona v. California, 283 
U.S. 423, 455 (1931); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27,55 (1904). This rule, however, 
seems to apply only when the legislature is clearly acting within its proper powers. See, 
e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. a t  133. Penal legislation is one area where 
scrutiny of legislative motive is apparently permissible. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
94-96 (1958). 
126. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra. 
127. 433 U.S. a t  482 n.47. An alternative deduction is also entirely possible-that the 
legislative history of this Act offers a paradigm of a Congress aware of the motivational 
test and carefully seeking to avoid it. 
128. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra. 
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The present attainder doctrine, with its overreliance on equal 
protection concepts, threatens to destroy the prohibition against 
bills of attainder as a "bulwark against tyranny" distinct from 
other constitutional safeguards. The pervasive concern with legit- 
imate purposes and classifications obscures the underlying issue. 
The emphasis is upon the ends sought, with insufficient attention 
being given to the permissibility of the means. The question in 
attainder cases should be whether or not the legislative branch 
has determined with finality that a particular individual or group 
deserves sanction that the legislature proceeds to impose without 
the protections of due process. 
An analysis effectively reaching the basic evil of attainders 
must recognize that certain determinations are beyond "the pe- 
culiar province of the legislature"129 no matter how legitimate the 
legislative concern may be. Therefore, a restatement of the basic 
definition of a bill of attainder is preferable: A bill of attainder 
legislatively imposes punishment upon an individual or group 
selected on the basis of essentially adjudicative criteria. The 
analysis under this definition would continue to deal with the 
same basic elements as the Court's present doctrine (specificity 
and punishment), but with significant refinements necessary to 
clarify the basic issues. This section will elaborate the suggested 
analysis and demonstrate its application. 
A.  T h e  Elements of an  Attainder 
1. Specificity 
Strict limitation of the legislature to general rulemaking 
would require that any classification satisfy the specificity ele- 
ment. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized the necessity 
and permissibility of enactments involving some specification in 
order to meet particular problems.130 Under the proposed attain- 
der analysis, the specificity element is satisfied if the enactment 
applies to a classification based upon a legislative determination 
of adjudicative facts. 131 
129. See note 1 and accompanying text supra. 
130. See note 94 supra. 
131. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis first articulated the concept of adjudicative fact 
in the context of administrative law in order to resolve the issue of what type of hearing 
is required prior to agency action. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 5 7.02, a t  413 
(1958). The administrative law question is not entirely analogous to the separation of 
powers problem underlying the attainder analysis, because administrative agencies gener- 
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As used here, adjudicative facts are those requiring an evalu- 
ation of a particular party or its activities. Professor Kenneth 
Culp Davis has explained that "[a]djudicative facts usually an- 
swer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with 
what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of 
facts that to go a jury in a jury case."132 This definition, being 
framed solely in terms of past activities, meets only part of the 
problem in attainder cases. Such a limited view of the attainder 
prohibition, long advocated by Justice Frankfurter, has been cor- 
rectly rejected by the Court.133 To accommodate the more expan- 
sive position, the concept of adjudicative fact must also include 
those facts which answer the questions of who is likely to do 
"what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent," 
when the answers depend upon some evaluation of character.134 
In contrast to adjudicative facts, legislative facts are "general 
facts which help . . . decide questions of law and policy and 
discretion. "l" Legislative facts are those requiring no judgment as 
to a party's character in terms of fault, culpability, motivation, 
intentions, or voluntary propensities. The importance of the voli- 
ally possess both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions and therefore the question 
involves the choice of procedure within a single institution. In addition, administrative 
procedure must conform to the statutory framework imposed by the Administrative Proce- 
dure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§  551-559 (1970). In both situations, however, the concern is with 
affording due process to those upon whom governmental power impacts. Therefore, i t  
would seem that the notion of adjudicative fact can be usefully adapted to the attainder 
analysis. 
The concept has been adopted for the Federal Rules of Evidence on the question of 
judicial notice. FED. R. EMD. 201. Cf. Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: 
A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 352-54 (1962) 
(suggesting that the legislature may make judgments based upon "judicially noticeable" 
propositions). 
132. K. DAVIS, supra note 131, § 7.02, a t  413. 
133. See notes 20-35 and accompanying text supra. 
134. See Wormuth, Legislative Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 VAND. L. 
REV. 603, 610-15 (1951). The position of Professor Wormuth that character evaluation 
violates the bill of attainder prohibition was criticized without further explanation as "but 
a variant of the traditional 'punitive intent' test and subject to the same difficulties." 
Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of 
Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 351 n.129 (1962). The Brown decision shows that this 
is not the case. In Brown, the Court rejected the "punitive intent" test, but went on to 
hold that the legislature had impermissibly evaluated the propensity of Communist Party 
members to instigate political strikes. 381 U.S. at  456-59. 
An evaluation of propensities will no doubt rest in large part upon adjudicative facts 
in Professor Davis' more limited sense. However, since these bases of classification are 
rarely explicit in the enactments or even in the legislative history, they must be deduced. 
To rely on the past activities definition alone would require one more level of implication 
that the courts would be reluctant to make, in much the same way as the Court has tried 
to avoid implying punitive intent. 
135. K. DAMS, supra note 131, § 7.02, a t  413. 
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tional aspect can be seen in the example of a law prohibiting the 
issuance of driver's licenses to grand ma1 epileptics. By singling 
out an identifiable group for sanction, the law clearly could be 
punishment based upon the likelihood of some harmful occur- 
rence; however, the law does not partake of the evil of attain- 
de r~ .~"  Classifications by sex, race, national origin, physical char- 
acteristics, mental capability, income, or marital status are 
usually based on legislative facts. The permissibility of such clas- 
sifications is determined by application of equal protection doc- 
trine. Here reasonableness and legitimate purposes, subject to 
strict scrutiny in some instances, adequately serve to check legis- 
lative action. 
As with most legal distinctions, there is a point where the line 
is not easily drawn and the labels fail to supply a clear-cut solu- 
t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  For example, the legislature may evaluate, in considerable 
detail, particular parties or their actions where the concern is not 
the parties themselves, but rather a more general situation with 
a legislative view toward policy determination. The implementa- 
tion of a zoning ordinance provides a good example. The adoption 
of a comprehensive scheme requires study of current land uses 
and may involve legislative determinations as to the future inten- 
tions of owners and others. The regulation may impose burdens 
on only a few individuals whose identity may even be known to 
the zoning authority. However, so long as the zoning plan is not 
arbitrary and is enacted in the interest of public health, safety, 
or general welfare, the legislature has acted properly. 
In this borderline area, equal protection and attainder doc- 
trines may seem to overlap. This can be seen in the challenge to 
an Illinois custody statute excluding unwed fathers from the defi- 
nition of "parent," thereby establishing a conclusive presumption 
of unfitness. The Supreme Court struck down the enactment 
under tortured equal protection scrutiny.ls8 Arguably, this issue 
136. See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach 
to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 351-52 (1962). 
137. professor Davis himself has said: 
The distinction . . . is a useful one and often even seems to be an essential one, 
even though in the borderland between the two categories the line is sometimes 
difficult or impossible to draw . . . [and] often has little or no utility. 
K. DAMS, supra note 131, 8 7.02, a t  414. See also Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing, " 123 
U .  PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 n.6, 1269 (1975); Nathanson, Book Review, 70 YALE L.J. 1210, 
1211-12 (1961). For an example of confusion about what constitutes "adjudicative facts" 
in the administrative law context, see Schneider v. Whaley, 417 F. Supp. 750, 757 
(S.D.N.Y.), modified, 541 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1976). 
138. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 & n.10 (1972). This case is generally classi- 
fied with the line of cases involving the much-criticized doctrine of "irrebuttable presump- 
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might also have been framed as a bill of attainder challenge since 
the classification was based upon a character evaluation of unwed 
fathers. 139 
The problems of the gray area between legislative and adju- 
dicative facts are not fatal to the usefulness of the distinction in 
the attainder analysis. First, the extent of the area of true indis- 
tinguishability is necessarily small, though perhaps not insignifi- 
cant. Second, satisfaction of the specificity element simply serves 
to trigger the rest of the analysis, and does not determine that an 
enactment constitutes a bill of attainder. If the legislature has 
arguably enacted a classification based on adjudicative facts, 
then the requisite threshold specificity is present. Since notions 
of specificity are included in the factors weighed under the dis- 
qualification branch of the punishment analysis proposed 
below,140 a court sincerely troubled by the closeness of the 
adjudicative-legislative distinction in a particular case might 
adopt that portion of the analysis regardless of the type of burden 
imposed by the statute under scrutiny. Finally, other trouble- 
some distinctions pervade the law; and while they may have been 
questionably applied in some, or even many, instances, they have 
nevertheless provided a necessary foundation upon which the 
decisionmaking process may proceed. 
The analysis' specificity element will always be satisfied 
where a particular individual or association is named in the legis- 
lation. The difficulty of determining the basis of such a classifica- 
tion requires such a result. Even where an otherwise permissible 
reason for the sanction is expressed (e.g., "John Doe, because he 
suffers from severe mental retardation, shall not be employed by 
the State in a position of responsibility"), the inscrutability of 
legislative intent generates uneasiness as to the real basis of the 
enactment. To single out a particular person raises the presump- 
tion that the legislature meant to reach "the person, not the 
calling."141 Similarly, it is conceivable that the legislature could 
tions." The Supreme Court based this doctrine on the due process clauses, but it has been 
argued that it is merely a variant of equal protection. See Note, Irrebuttable Presump- 
tions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975); Note, The Irrebuttable Presump- 
tion Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974). See also 1976 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 565. 
139. Not all the cases treated under the irrebuttable presumption doctrine would be 
susceptible to the bill of attainder analysis because they do not all involve a character 
evaluation of the parties affected. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 
(1974) (involving mandatory maternity leave for pregnant school teachers). 
140. See notes 151-65 and accompanying text infra. 
141. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320. See notes 100-02 and accom- 
panying text supra. 
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enumerate legislative facts to such a degree as to identify a par- 
ticular individual. In such cases, the analysis must recognize the 
substance of the situation created by the enactment. 
2. Punishment 
Specificity alone does not identify a bill of attainder; such an 
enactment must also impose punishment. What constitutes pun- 
ishment is not easily articulated and often depends on one's point 
of view. That which the regulator sees as a necessary regulation 
with incidental burdens may be perceived as a punitive sanction 
by those subject to the restrictions. Attempts by the courts to 
resolve the issue have culminated in the Nixon majority's three- 
pronged analysis with its attendant difficu1ties.l" Under the pro- 
posed analysis, punishment involves (1) the deprivation of a rec- 
ognized right, interest, or entitlement or (2) a disqualification or 
bar which, in light of all the circumstances, exceeds the permissi- 
ble bounds of regulation alone. 
a. Deprivations as punishment. In the abstract, a depriva- 
tion is distinguishable from a disqualification only with consider- 
able difficulty. For example, a statute establishing a law degree 
as a prerequisite for admittance to the bar may be viewed either 
as a deprivation of a "right" to pursue any chosen profession or 
as a disqualification to those without the required diploma. 
Therefore, the attainder punishment element requires a depriva- 
tion of a recognized interest, i. e.,  an interest traditionally pro- 
tected by the courts. The distinction is between actions against 
interests presently enjoyed and denials of requests or expecta- 
tions. 143 
Under this analysis, the deprivation-type punishment de- 
pends upon a historical test. But, unlike the Nixon historical 
test, 144 this test involves the question of whether a given interest 
has historically been afforded due process protection, not whether 
the deprivation itself has been historically used as punishment. 
Nevertheless, almost all of the historical attainder punishments 
would fit under the deprivation rubric. Death, imprisonment, 
banishment, and property confiscation are deprivations of pro- 
142. See notes 116-26 and accompanying text supra. 
143. See generally Friendly, supra note 137, at 1295-304. It is possible that a statute 
might work to impose a deprivation upon certain individuals but a disqualification as to 
others. In such situations, the court would be required to determine whether the disqualifi- 
cation constituted punishment and, if not, whether the applicability to the unattainted 
class could be separated to save the enactment to that extent. 
144. See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra. 
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tected rights in life, liberty, citizenship, and property, respec- 
tively. The loss of government employment (as in Lovettld5) also 
falls within the deprivation category of punishment. The courts 
have recognized public employment as an entitlement or type of 
property interest entitled to some degree of due process protec- 
tion.'" This notion of entitlement has expanded to cover many 
nontraditional interests,ld7 each of which could be subject to dep- 
rivation and thereby becomes a means of punishment. 
While a party may have no "legitimate claim of entitlement" 
to some potential benefit, but merely "a unilateral expectation" 
or "abstract need or desire,"lds a governmental bar to such future 
enjoyment may constitute punishment under the disqualification 
analysis. The attainders found in Cummings and Brown were of 
this type. In both cases, the decisions used language reminiscent 
of the equal protection rational basis test. However, comparing 
these cases to Ex parte Garland, where a rational basis might 
have been found,ld9 it becomes apparent that the analysis requires 
more than a simple application of equal protection doctrine.150 
b. Disqualifications as punishment. The disqualification- 
type punishment exists where the legislation serves to further 
detectable punitive purposes-retribution, condemnation, pre- 
vention, and rehabilitation-as opposed to purely regulatory pur- 
poses-protection, prevention, and efficiency.151 The factors bear- 
145. 328 U.S. at 303. 
146. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 
183, 191-92 (1952); cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (state law confers "certain 
procedural rights . . . found not to have been violated in this case"); Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U.S. 134 (1974) (dismissal for cause not a denial of due process rights created by the 
employment agreement); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (one-year employ- 
ment contract created no property or liberty interest for continuation of employment past 
the end of the contract period). But cf. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 
367 U.S. 886 (1961) (employment by private contractor on military base subject to sum- 
mary termination by government administrative officer). 
147. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Social Security disability bene- 
fits); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school attendance); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 
(1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Cara- 
mico v. Secretary of HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974) (tenant occupancy rights in prop- 
erty with FHA-insured mortgage). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 
(1974). 
148. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
149. See note 122 and accompanying text supra. 
150. The Ex parte Garland Court adopted the Cummings analysis by reference. 71 
U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377-78, 380. In addition, however, the Court dealt a t  length with the 
peculiar position of the attorney as an officer of the Court and the fact that the petitioner 
had received a full pardon from the President. Id. at 378-81. 
151. Prevention is listed as a characteristic of both regulation and punishment; but 
there is a significant difference. Regulatory prevention anticipates a general situation, 
while punitive prevention, apart from any general deterrent effect, focuses upon a particu- 
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ing upon this determination may be roughly grouped into three 
broad categories: (1) the class affected, (2) the burden imposed, 
and (3) the legislative motivation. 
The examination of the class affected partakes of some of the 
same notions that are involved in the threshold specificity analy- 
sis. It should be remembered, however, that the specificity ele- 
ment has already been satisfied and that the statute therefore 
adversely affects only a segment of the population selected on the 
basis of past activities or an evaluation of some flaw in character. 
This conclusion establishes a sort of presumption of irregularity 
that may be overcome by the weight of other factors tending to 
show the absence of punishment. The presumption grows 
stronger as the classification moves along the continuum from 
general to particular. In reality, there may be two specificity con- 
tinua: one involving the size of the class and the other depending 
upon the extent of adjudication involved. This latter adjudi- 
cative-legislative continuum is most important to the specifi- 
city analysis which decides that the enactment falls into the 
adjudicative area. In determining whether the statute imposes 
punishment, however, an explicit legislative finding of guilt 
would have more weight than an implied legislative evaluation. 
The numerical continuum is especially important at the inferior 
extreme. The extreme case of a named individual should estab- 
lish a nearly conclusive presumption of impermissibility. This 
notion was recognized by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in 
Nixon u. Administrator of General Services. 152 The type of specifi- 
cation might also be significant. For example, a specification 
which implicated the exercise of constitutionally protected rights 
would be more difficult to justify than one which did not, even 
ignoring the other constitutional problems. 
The nature of the burden imposed is relevant with respect to 
the relationship of the disqualification to the classification, the 
type of burden imposed, the feasibility of less burdensome alter- 
natives, and the reasonableness of the expectations thwarted. 
That the classification scheme must have a rational relationship 
to the burdens imposed was established in the first attainder 
case153 and further elaborated to include notions of overinclu- 
siveness and underinclu~iveness.~~~ The difficulty in the Nixon 
lar individual after a determination of guilt or fault. 
152. 433 U S .  at 484-86 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also United States v. Brown, 
381 US. at 463,475 (White, J., dissenting); Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specifi- 
cation: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALELJ. 330,356 (1962). 
153. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U S .  (4 Wall.) at 319-20. 
154. See note 110 and accompanying text supra. 
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analysis grew out of its sole reliance on these equal protection 
concepts-not that such considerations are wholly inapposite. 
The type of disability created by the legislation under scru- 
tiny is also relevant. Affirmative disabilities tend to be more pu- 
nitive in nature than surmountable restraints.lJ5 Similarly, the 
disability which acts as a complete bar is more severe than one 
which may be avoided by a choice between two positions. While 
severity of the disability is not determinative of punishment,lJ6 
the incorporation of a sanction disproportionate to nonpunitive 
purposes would be strong evidence of impermissibility.lJ7 The 
availability of less burdensome alternatives that would satisfy the 
legitimate purposes behind the enactment would also be a rele- 
vant consideration.ls8 The area in which the disability occurs 
could determine the reasonableness of private expectations and 
the permissibility of legislative interference. For example, greater 
L legislative control of a heavily regulated industry would tend to 
support a system of qualification. On the other hand, a prisoner's 
expectation of parole, while not a right, is not unjustified in light 
of current practice.lJg The Ex parte Garland opinion implied that 
the scope of legislative control in a particular field could be a 
pertinent consideration. There, the Court dealt with the special 
status of attorneys as officers of the court as an indication of 
improper congressional action in an area of nonexclusive jurisdic- 
tion.lsO 
Finally, to the extent it can be discerned, the legislative mo- 
tivation behind the enactment may be evidence of impropriety. 
This factor comprises the third test of the Nixon decision with its 
examination of legislative history for evidence of punitive in- 
tent.161 In addition, however, the political climate in which the 
legislation arises deserves consideration. While the Nixon Court 
refused to indulge in "personalized reading of the contemporary 
scene or recent history,"lM previous courts have not been so reluc- 
tant. The Cummings majority explicitly referred to the passions 
155. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,168-63 (1963). Compare American 
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) with United States v. Brown, 381 
U.S. at 437. 
156. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 616 n.9. 
157. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
158. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 482-83. 
159. While the legislature might decide that all those convicted of certain crimes 
should not be eligible for parole, a law denying parole to a particular convict would seem 
to involve impermissible adjudication by the legislature. 
160. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378-80. 
161. 433 U.S. at 478. 
162. Id. at 484. 
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aroused by the Civil War and their inevitable influence on the 
1eg i~ la tu re . l~~  This reference was mentioned approvingly in 
Flemming. lB4 The Brown opinion also took note of the traditional 
utilization of bills of attainder to reach possible political foes.lB5 
None of the foregoing factors, considered alone, is determina- 
tive of a punitive disqualification. Such a finding must rest upon 
the impression derived from consideration of them all, weighed 
against the individual's right to due process. 
B. A n  Illustrative Application of the Proposed Analysis 
The soundness of any legal analysis depends to a certain 
extent upon its ability to harmonize the results of prior cases or 
to point out explainable error in isolated instances. As an illustra- 
tion, the foregoing proposal as applied to the facts of the Ninon 
case will be contrasted with its application to the conflict-of- 
interest provision of the banking regulations that posed such dif- 
ficulty in Brown. The analysis does not promise a clear-cut con- 
clusion from any particular set of facts, but it is hoped that the 
"specification of the relevant factors may help to produce more 
principled and predictable decisions."166 
The requisite specificity is present in both cases. The Presi- 
dential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act singles out the 
administration of Richard M. Nixon for special treatment and 
therefore partakes of the problems of enactments with named 
individuals. In addition, however, the legislation rests upon a 
judgment by the Congress that Mr. Nixon would be likely to 
handle his Presidential materials so as to preclude the discovery 
of the truth behind the Watergate scandal if such evidence could 
be found in the materials. Similarly, the conflict-of-interest law 
focuses upon persons holding particular positions as likely to mis- 
manage bank affairs, and therefore impugns the character of 
those persons. 
The punishment analysis of the Ninon situation depends on 
several contingencies, an in-depth treatment of which is beyond 
the scope of this Comment. First, the Court could have found that 
the former President owned the materials.16' Given such a result, 
163. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) a t  322. 
164. 363 U.S. a t  615. 
165. 381 U.S. a t  453. In light of these precedents, it is somewhat ironic that Justice 
Stevens was willing to take judicial notice of the political events surrounding the Water- 
gate affair as a justification for the statute under scrutiny in Nixon. 433 U.S. a t  486 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
166. Friendly, supra note 137, a t  1278. 
167. See note 84 supra. 
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the eminent domain provisions of the Act would come into play. 
If the materials were taken for a legitimate "public use," the 
analysis would end since there is no confiscation of property in 
the strict sense, but rather an exchange for just compensation. 
Failure to find a "public use" would result in a finding of a bill 
of attainder because there would be a deprivation of a recognized 
property right. Second, the Court might have found that Mr. 
Nixon had no recognized right in the property. Nevertheless, in 
light of the treatment afforded other Presidents and federal offi- 
cials under de facto practice and the statutory provisions for the 
creation of Presidential libraries, the confiscation might still con- 
stitute a bill of attainder under the punitive disqualification rub- 
r i ~ . ' ~ ~  The Act focuses upon a single individual, thereby raising a 
very strong presumption of impropriety. While legitimate pur- 
poses for the regulation and its narrow applicability have been 
articulated, clearly less burdensome alternatives could have ac- 
complished the desired result. For example, a statute might have 
prohibited destruction or alteration of any Watergate-related 
materials and required prompt establishment of a depository 
Presidential library. Third, the Act grew out of the political tur- 
moil of Watergate and targeted the ultimate victim of the scan- 
dal. On balance, the legitimate ends sought seem outweighed by 
the punitive character of the enactment. 
On the other hand, the conflict-of-interest law involves no 
deprivation of a recognized right. While a person might aspire to 
occupy a position of bank responsibility, this aspiration is a 
"unilateral expectation or desire." Under the disqualification 
analysis, the degree of specificity is relatively broad in the numer- 
ical sense and rationally related to the desired regulation. The 
disqualification is not absolute because it may be overcome by 
resignation from the position of perceived conflict. The banking 
industry is also heavily regulated in all of its aspects; therefore 
the disqualification is part of a pervasive regulatory system, not 
an isolated attack upon a class. There is no evidence of an intent 
to punish those working in the securities market. Finally, the 
enactment arose from an economic rather than a political crisis. 
The Flemming decision perhaps deserves a parenthetical 
comment. There, the Court noted that a deprivation of a 
"noncontractual governmental benefit" did not constitute pun- 
ishment? Subsequently, the Supreme Court recognized the no- 
168. The disqualification involved would be a denial of custody and possession of the 
materials and power over their future disposition. 
169. 363 U.S. at 617. 
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tion of entitlement that would probably be applicable to Social 
Security retirement benefits.170 Under the proposed analysis, the 
deprivation there would satisfy the punishment element, and the 
statutory provision would fail as a bill of attainder. 
The major attainder cases may be reconciled by application 
of the proposed analysis. The exceptions are the cases involving 
the antisubversive enactments that passed Court scrutiny after 
Lovett and that were essentially overruled by the Brown deci- 
sion.171 It is hoped that the proposed analysis provides a compre- 
hensive framework for handling subsequent cases without undue 
emphasis on any particular consideration lifted from prior deci- 
sions in isolation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's development of the bill of attainder 
doctrine has suffered from the irregularity with which such cases 
have arisen. The major cases, while probably correct in result, 
have lacked a desirable cohesiveness that would come from a 
consensus about the interests intended to be protected by the 
attainder prohibition. Therefore, the opinions seem to flow as an 
afterthought from a decision reached on the basis of intuitive 
reaction to the challenged enactment in light of general notions 
about the nature of attainders. The opinion writers have adopted 
language developed elsewhere that fits nicely as applied to the 
case at hand. When the Nixon Court attempted finally to articu- 
late a definitive analytic structure, familiarity with equal protec- 
tion concepts resulted in a formulation of the attainder doctrine 
providing little distinguishable protection. 
Due process, as structually guaranteed by the separation of 
powers, in the evaluation of activities, motives, and propensities 
of individuals provides the best foundation for a workable and 
truly separate bill of attainder analysis. The experience of al- 
most two centuries does not serve as a sufficient check on a legis- 
lature intent on punishing an unpopular individual or group. The 
courts must assume this protective responsibility. In the words 
of Professor Chafee: 
If legislators are determined not to be guardians of the liberties 
of the people and if judges refuse to interfere when legislators 
take those liberties away, what is the use of putting guarantees 
of fundamental rights into the Constitution except, perhaps, to 
170. See note 147 and accompanying text supra. 
171. See notes 23-35 and accompanying text supra. 
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furnish political orators with noble words to quote while they tell 
us Americans to thank God that we are not as other men are?"* 
A comprehensive attainder doctrine, designed to shield the vital 
right to a judicial determination of guilt or fault, can effectively 
meet this challenge. 
The analysis suggested by this Comment emphasizes the 
nature of both the classification scheme and the interest inter- 
fered with. Legislative specificity based on individualized evalua- 
tions are inherently suspect. Rights and entitlements tradition- 
ally afforded due process protection in other contexts may not be 
denied on the basis of such evaluations. Other burdens imposed 
upon such censured parties must have strong justification in a 
permissible, nonpunitive scheme of general regulation. This justi- 
fication must be found after consideration of all the surrounding 
circumstances. Such a formulation of the analysis is necessary to 
prevent legislative punishment masquerading as regulation be- 
hind the presumptive disguise of rational basis and legitimate 
classification. 
Carl F. Huefner 
172. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 161. 
